Rui Silva, University of East Anglia
Anger and resentment have become the accepted currency of populist politicians. Donald Trump is generally the first example that comes to mind, but Europe has its fair share of these leaders too, from Viktor Orban in Hungary and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands to Marine Le Pen in France and Giorgia Meloni in Italy.
These politicians portray life, the economy, and society in the present as being far worse than in the past. This is because of immigration, globalisation, taxation, corruption, and the excessive influence of politicians and intellectuals. And by positioning themselves as outsiders, they don’t have to accept any role in these wrongs.
Traditionally, when voters felt a government hadn’t delivered for them, they’d punish that government at the ballot box by voting for the main moderate (centrist) opposition party. This dynamic characterised European politics until about 20 years ago. Now, however, the punishment vote goes to populist parties.
This change can be seen by looking at the electoral performance of the largest populist parties in 17 European countries. If we look at elections held around 2000 and then the most recent election, we can see that almost all of those parties have grown in strength.
Countries that were most affected by the financial crisis of 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 – such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Ireland – saw the emergence of populist parties. The governments of these nations had implemented painful recovery programmes, frequently anchored on austere economic policies (such as tax rises and spending cuts).
At the beginning of 2000, populist parties were either nonexistent or somewhat irrelevant in these countries. But by the time of the most recent national elections in each, the picture was very different. In Italy, a populist party is now in government. In Greece and Ireland, populists lead the opposition.
Spain and Greece have also both experienced coalition governments that have included radical left populist parties (Syriza and Podemos) in the past 20 years.
And in countries like Germany, Sweden, and Austria – some of the main recipients of asylum requests during the 2015 European migrant crisis – radical right populist parties have gained particular relevance. Fundamentally nativist parties are in opposition in Austria and Sweden. Perhaps most famously, the far-right AfD is consistently making gains in regional elections in Germany and is polling second nationally.
In my research, I’ve found that people who report feeling very dissatisfied and unhappy with their lives were up to 10 percentage points more likely to support a populist compared to those who are extremely satisfied.
In 17 countries where far-right populist parties have parliamentary seats, people who reported feeling very dissatisfied with their lives were 7.4 percentage points more likely to support those parties than those who were extremely satisfied.
In seven countries where we find far-left populist parties represented in the national parliament, very dissatisfied people were 8.2 percentage points more likely to support those parties than those who are extremely satisfied.
Countries marked by persistent economic inequality and social divides or which experienced severe economic recessions and austerity prove fertile ground for populists. The financial crisis of 2008 preceded a surge for the far left and the refugee crisis in 2015 a surge for the far right.
Distrust as the vehicle
The key to understanding why dissatisfied people are more likely to support populists nowadays than in the past lies in trust – or lack thereof it.
Political trust is, in essence, the belief that a party or politician or can (and wants to) improve your life when they take office – or that the institutions of government are capable of doing so.
Departing from a baseline with a relatively high level of trust (which, in a way, was the case before 2000), successive governments in many countries appear to have failed to substantially improve the lives of certain segments of the population.
Among working class people and people without a degree, life satisfaction has not increased. Their median level of satisfaction and happiness did not change at all between 2002 and 2018. What’s more, the gap between this group’s median level of life satisfaction and that of groups with higher education and highly skilled workers has not been reduced. In some cases, it has widened.
The perpetuation of a state of dissatisfaction has gradually eroded the trust of these voters. Many no longer believe that mainstream parties and politicians, if elected, would implement policies to help them. This has fuelled further support for populists. People who are extremely distrustful of politicians and political parties were 14 percentage points more likely to support far-right populist parties compared to those who do trust politicians.
The successes of Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and the Freedom Party of Austria show that there is no immediate prospect of a downturn in support for populists.
Arguably, however, the most sensible strategy to overturn this trend is for moderate politicians and parties to invest in strategies that alleviate feelings of unresponsiveness among voters. They might perhaps begin with those without a higher education.
Those same parties should focus on restoring their credibility by looking back at how they managed the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 migration crisis with the benefit of hindsight.
Rui Silva, Lecturer in Economics, University of East Anglia
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Photo credit: Prachatai
