By Harry Hodge (UEA)
Donald Trump has been elected president for a second term, and Europe is in fear of the consequences. This time it appears catastrophic as, unlike in 2016 when Trump was first elected, Europe is a lot more unstable today. The EU’s largest economic powers, Germany and France, are weakened by economic and political crises. Right-wing populists, playing on fears of globalisation and migration, are on the rise across Europe. And Russian troops are slowly grinding forward against Ukrainian defenders, while the west is not delivering enough support for Kyiv to prevail.
A different era
When Donald Trump was first elected it 2016, the political landscape was markedly different. The European continent was able to face Trump’s antics with strong leadership. Then, his counterparts were Emmanuel Macron in France, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, Giuseppe Conte in Italy, and his arch-nemesis, Angela Merkel in Germany. Regardless of their record, they were moderates and benefited from the support of relatively strong coalitions. In 2016, it was only Hungary’s Viktor Orbán who publicly supported Trump for President. This left Trump with few like-minded leaders on the European continent to strike deals with.
In addition to such solid centrist leadership, the European economy was relatively strong. The post-Eurozone crisis boom saw major EU economies experiencing relatively high levels of GDP growth. With Germany’s GDP growth reaching a six-year high of 2.2% in 2017, it provided the government with tax revenue to fund public services and counter the far-right narrative that centrist governments were failing.
‘America First’
Donald Trump’s first term in office demonstrated a ‘profound hostility towards the European Union and a preference for the company of autocrats’, as shown by his many dealings with Vladimir Putin. It is these dealings with autocratic leaders that will certainly characterise his second term in office. And Europe now has many leaders who can be described as autocratic or authoritarian, and several more likely to come into positions of power during his administration. Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico is one such example of an increasingly authoritarian leader, whose coming back to power reflects the shifting political consensus in Europe and who plays directly into the Trump narrative. Since being elected in 2023, he has moved towards authoritarianism; he has withdrawn funding for LGBTQ+ groups and clamped down on critical voices, which is a ‘leaf out of Vladimir Putin’s playbook’.
‘America First’ was the main slogan of the 2024 Donald Trump presidential campaign, focussing on protecting American industries by proposing a 10-25% tariff on all imports into the country with a complete disregard for trading partners. This is particularly problematic for the European Union, as the United States is the ‘leading destination for EU exports in 2023, accounting for 19.7% of the EU’s total exports outside the bloc.’ Analysts at Goldman Sachs predict the euro could drop as much as 10 percent against the dollar if the new administration enacts its across-the-board tariff plan, while earnings among a group of Europe’s largest companies could fall by more than 5 percent next year. With the US the single biggest export market for German carmakers, BMW, Mercedes and Volkswagenshares all fell between 5% and 7% after Trump’s victory confirmation.
These proposed tariffs pose the EU and its member states a dilemma, with a decision to make soon. Either impose retaliatory tariffs and start a trade war which will be detrimental for both sides or attempt to secure an exemption from US tariffs. The EU could try to secure an exemption by promising to buy more American products, like the deals which then Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker reached with Trump in 2018. The US relies on the EU for 32 strategically important import products, mainly in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors. This dependency provides the EU with some leverage in negotiations with the incoming Trump administration. Whether the EU will be successful with obtaining exemptions again is hard to say given Trump’s hardened stance this time around and increased unpredictability.
Protectionism will become problematic not just for goods, but for services too. The EU’s attempt to regulate social media platforms through the Digital Services Act (DSA) come in direct conflict with the new US administration. Top social media bosses such as Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg, who both have close ties to President Trump, have criticised EU laws such as the DSA. Meta chief Zuckerberg suggested that the European Commission’s application of competition rules acts ‘almost like a tariff’ on US tech companies.
The influence that social media companies such as Meta and X have over EU citizens is seen as problematic not just for economic reasons. It could enable them to push a pro-Trump agenda and potentially bolster the popularity of far-right parties such as the Germany’s AFD, which Musk has publicly supported. These political disagreements will contribute to pouring additional fuel on the conflict between the EU and US over trade, straining relations even further.
A European ‘Illiberal’ revolution?
The rise of far-right populist leaders in Europe plays into the Trump narrative. The Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been the closest ally of Trump in Europe since she became Prime Minister in 2022, meeting with the President on multiple occasions. This included visiting his Mar-a-Lago campaign base and even attending the Presidential inauguration. Meloni’s positioning as anti-immigration and anti-abortion, and her already strong relationship with Trump’s billionaire ally Elon Musk, could result in her country becoming the US President’s main conduit for influence in Europe.
The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long been one of the most vocal supporters of Trump, meeting the US president-elect at his Mar-a-Lago campaign base in July of 2024. Orbán would like to position himself as Trump’s man in Europe, and has been spending the past four years building ties with the president-elect and the MAGA wing of the Republican party. Trump even namechecked Orbán – a Eurosceptic Putin-supporter – during the presidential debate.
Trump’s influence in Europe via leaders like Meloni and Orbán could contribute to pull European conservatives further to the right on migration and gender issues, and ultimately to weaken Europe’s liberal values.
A new Iron Curtain?
Trump has repeatedly suggested that he would bring the war in Ukraine to a rapid conclusion, touting his good relations with Vladimir Putin. His particular dislike for Volodymyr Zelensky, and reluctance to continue US funding of Ukraine, poses a security risk for the European Union. In September 2024, Trump complained that “we continue to give billions of dollars to a man who refused to make a deal.’’ With the US’ position as one of Ukraine’s largest donors at €119bn since the full-scale invasion in 2022, a US withdrawal of funding puts the EU at a crossroads. Keep funding the same and risk further Russian advances into Ukrainian territory, which poses significant security risks to the Union itself; or increase funding to meet the US deficit, but in a context where public finances are already under strain and public opinions more hesitant.
The EU may risk becoming increasingly fragmented on its policies towards Ukraine. Hungary’s Orbán and Slovakia’s Fico have both publicly criticised the West’s response to the war. In the context of high inflation and low growth across the European continent, increasing funding could be a hard sell. This could give Putin the green light to push military forces deeper into Ukrainian territory and reduce even further Ukraine’s leverage in the potential peace negotiations that Trump is keen on initiating.
Donald Trump’s election victory poses the EU with unprecedented challenges that could shake the foundations of the organisation to its core. Trump’s disruptive approach to diplomacy will leave the EU in crisis over Ukraine, and the far-right will continue to rise. It is imperative that the EU maintains unity, because its very existence depends upon it, and turns this challenge into an opportunity for developing a more independent course on trade and foreign policy that is less reliant on its increasingly volatile traditional ally and security partner.
Harry Hodge is a second year International Relations and Politics student at the University of East Anglia. His interests include British and European politics, as well as global political economy.
